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Abstract: This paper aims at exploring the geometry of the Romania’s relations with the Arab states 
from the Middle East (Kuwait, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, 
Yemen) and Iran, by unveiling the responsible elements that shaped the matrix of bilateral 
interactions in the period 1989-2010. Moreover, the paper will focus on the conceptual overlapping 
between Romania’s relations with these actors and the exogenous patterns of influences that played 
an important role in the articulation and development of Bucharest’s foreign policy deliverables.  
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Following the 1989 unrest that led to the collapse of the Ceausescu regime, 
Romania’s privileged relations with the large plethora of (non US-aligned) Arab 
states and Iran manifested a gradual slowdown, to the very point that they 
eventually occupied – after mid-1900s, only a peripheral and deeply rhetorical role 
in Bucharest’s foreign policy agenda.  
In particular, Ceausescu’s 1989 execution equated with the disappearing of the 
cardinal catalytic force that energized and directed the development of the 
Romanian-Arab relations, especially as the new leadership tried – in order to 
highlight its democratic, moral and political pedigree – to repudiate all policies and 
connections associated with Ceausescu’s independent foreign policy agenda and 
domestic sultanistic regime.  
Although it is difficult to asses its magnitude in terms of foreign policy 
deliverables, the employment of the Arab commandos thesis – picturing Lybian, 
Syrian and Palestinian terrorists fighting alongside Ceausescu’s fanatic supporters 
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and murdering Romanian civilians – by chief figures of the new establishment (the 
president of the first Parliamentary Commission for the Research of the 1989 
Revolution included) could have had a moulding role in the development of the 
Romanian-Arab relations.1 
Without a key figure to cultivate the pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab credentials and 
arguably lacking a real interest in continuing former regimes’ policies aimed to 
develop the indigenous oil and chemical industries or export-oriented industries 
that supplied most of Romanian exports to developing countries, the new regime 
found no incentives in pursuing privileged relations with Arab states.  
Moreover, gradual trade liberalization that ended all nonconvertible currency 
transactions, led to a structural shift of Romania’s trade orientations towards 
convertible markets interested in Romanian exports and where quality imports 
were abounding (Shen, 1997, p. 173), a perspective change that could be easily 
visualised in the case of Romanian trade relations with its partners from within the 
Arab world.  
For instance, if in 1989 Iraq, Egypt and Iran occupied the 7th, the 8th and 
respectively the 10th positions among Bucharest’s main trade partners, totalling 
more than 10% of Romanian exports and 17% of Romanian imports, although Iran 
– the country to which Romanian recorded its biggest trade deficit – counted for 
12% itself (National Commission for Statistics, Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 
1994, pp. 618- 635) by 1993 – due to the UN embargo on Iraq, solidification of 
trade liberalization, diversification of trade relations and securitization of 
generalized customs preferences from many Western economies which ‘prompted 
the trade efforts’ convergence on hard currency markets’ (Shen, 1997, pp. 175, 
180) and diversification of indigenous export base – no Arab country was among 
Romania’s top 6 export markets. Between 1990 and 1994, Iran would however 
remain an important import source and a trade partner with which Romania 
recorded exceeding trade deficit as it counted for US$ 604 million equating 9.3% 
of Romania’s imports in 1993, yet slowly falling to US$ 223 million by 1995 – 
when it left the top 6 sources for Romanian imports, in favour of Egypt (National 
Commission for Statistics – Foreign Trade Statistics, Romanian Statistical 
Yearbook, 1995, pp. 10-17).  
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This situation happened, argues Rus, due to the fact that by the end of 1995 
Romania increased its attention to Egypt – a traditional mediator in the Middle East 
– an attitude that materialized through a boost of the bilateral trade that reached 
US$ 600 million in 1996, yet of which US$ 400 million represented Egyptian 
exports in Romania (2009, p. 100) while trying to comply with US foreign affairs 
perspectives, in order to capitalize from Washington’s support and thus strengthen 
its Euro-Atlantic membership candidate file. 
In the absence of Ceausescu, Romanian relations with the Arab world continued to 
manifest certain inertia, yet the new Romanian leadership actions lacked a certain 
convergence in maintaining the pace and amplitude they had in the Communist 
period. Furthermore, despite inheriting the state’s ‘balanced relationship with both 
Palestinians and Israelis’ – resulting from Bucharest’s pre-1989 efforts to ‘bridge 
the gap’ separating the two conflicting camps and also despite the fact that 
Ceausescu’s perspectives and influence shaped prepared ground for the 1991 Peace 
Conference and for the 1993 Oslo Agreement (Govrin, 2002, pp. 166, 138) – the 
lack of political and economic resources severely limited Romania’s chances to 
play the mediator role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
However, Romanian diplomatic efforts, allowed President of the Crans Montana 
Forum, Jean-Paul Carteron to gather in Bucharest, during organization’s reunion 
from Bucharest in April 1994, both PLO President Yasser Arafat and (then) Israeli 
Foreign Affairs Minister Shimon Peres. The meeting aimed to find a solution for 
overcoming the obstacles that stalled the negotiations and thus to contribute to the 
resuming of the seriously threatened peace process, played a nodal role in the 
drafting of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, signed on May 4th 1994 in Cairo. 
Romania’s steadfastly opposition to an imposed solution and its preference and 
support for dialogue and direct negotiations between the parties, granted Bucharest 
an invitation to ‘participate into the multilateral negotiations over the Middle East 
conflict’ (Melescanu, 2002, p. 180; Ciuhandu, 2008, p. 9) and – in recognisance of 
its involvement – to take part in the Agreement’s signing ceremony (Cioculescu, 
2009: 201). 
A significant moment in the evolution of the Romanian-Arab relations was 
represented by the 1990 outbreak of the Ba’athist Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when 
Romanian Ambassador to the United Nations, Aurel Dragos Munteanu was 
holding the presidency of the UN Security Council. Somehow forced to attenuate 
the negative effects generated by the governmental support for the ‘mineriads’ and 
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by the management of the ‘inter-ethnic conflicts from TarguMures’ Bucharest 
leadership used this position in order to reassert itself as a promoter, by endorsing 
the idea that UN have to take action in order to protect the sovereignty of a state – 
in the framework defined by the international law. However, through its 
Ambassador, Romania expressed the fears that unilateral action of the US to 
intervene in the Middle East crisis could act as a precedent for future Soviet 
behaviour within Kremlin’s sphere of interest (Harrington et al, 1995, p. 208).  
Although Romanian stance was a pro-democratic and arguably pro-Western one, it 
wasn’t at all anti-Soviet: as Kosminsky and Jones summarize, unlike other post-
World War II conflicts, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait ‘wasn’t mainly ‘an East-
West confrontation’ as Washington and Moscow neither weren’t ‘squared off 
eyeball-to-eyeball as they were in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War’ neither were 
‘backing opposing sides, as they were in the 1982-1983 Lebanon crisis’ (1990, p. 
1). In addition, claim the authors, despite being very vocal against the Iraqi 
aggression against the small emirate, and by endorsing UN resolutions against Iraq, 
including a trade embargo and the use of force for enforcing the embargo if 
needed, Gorbachev appeared to chart ‘a middle course in the Iraqi crisis, maintain 
his military ties with Baghdad, while offering some rhetorical and diplomatic 
support in the West’ (Kosminsky & Jones, 1990, p. 2). 
On another hand, by supporting all the resolutions and sanctions against Iraq, a 
political stance severely directed against its immediate economic interests as it had 
to face a potential loss of ‘up to US$3 billion in oil refining revenues and defaulted 
Iraqi loans’ Bucharest gained some stature and legitimacy in the international 
community. Nevertheless, Bucharest’s commitment to ‘the full respect for 
international law’ is not only the proof of a newly discovered democratic vocation 
of the early 1990 Romanian government but an expression of the very conviction 
that such behaviour could be the ‘best shield for Romania’ in its interaction with 
Kremlin (Harrington et al, 1995, p. 208). Furthermore, in order to highlight 
Romania’s genuine vocation for the respect of the UN Charter, Romanian Prime 
Minister paid a visit to Kuwait, in May 1991, while later Bucharest joined the 
military mission for monitoring the Kuwait-Iraqi border. 
In this context – by taking advantage of the increased visibility and positive image 
of a state that defends the international law – Romania established diplomatic 
relations with United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain, thus 
completing the diplomatic portfolio that previously included Oman, Kuwait, 
RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
 119 
Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Lebanon and Iran (Cioculescu, 
2009: 200).  
With mid-1996, the monopolization of Bucharest’s foreign policy resources – due 
to the prevalence of NATO accession process in Romania’s agenda – left only 
marginal and thus modest institutional capacities to tackle alternative diplomatic 
projects. The impossibility to recoup substantial debts from Iraq, Egypt or Libya, 
the diversification of trade relations, the structural mutations of the economy 
during its transition period and the tendency to support trade efforts converging on 
Western markets led to a certain distancing from the Arab markets, especially in 
the case of the states that were placed under the incidence of US ‘state-sponsors of 
terrorism’ designation – Syria (1979), Libya (1979), Iraq (1979), Iran (1984), or 
under UN sanctions, as a manifestation of Romania’s diplomacy’s extreme 
responsiveness to Washington’s and generally Western sensitivities.  
After 9/11 and arguably till mid-2000s, Romania’s relations with the (non US-
aligned) Arab world and Iran followed the lines established by the mainstream 
Euro-Atlantic epicentres of power – as Middle East’s political, security and 
economic architecture was granted different valences in Washington and, more or 
less, Brussels. The terrorist attacks that hit US (2001) but most of all those from 
Madrid (2004) – when the number of Romanian citizens killed was surpassed only 
by the number of the Spanish victims – and London (2005), triggered important 
mutations in the relatively Islam-friendly Romanian society (Rus, 2009, p. 180), as 
the general social perception began to align itself with the mainstream stereotypes 
picturing any Muslim or Arab as a potential terrorist. The absence of a significant 
Muslim minority and of a powerful Muslim lobbies like in France, Germany or UK 
left the development of the public perceptions at individual level. 
On another hand, Romania’s relations with the benign, US-friendly Arab states 
were characterized by a relatively positive dynamic, materialized through 
reciprocal high level visits, through various agreements meant to bolster economic 
trade, investment and through the establishment of various joint institutions, 
ministerial commissions, or parliamentary friendship groups.  
The advert to power of president Traian Basescu triggered a spectral shift in 
Romania’s perception and attitude towards the Middle East, arguably due to the 
fact that the completion of the EU accession negotiation process in 2004 confined 
Romania’s EU membership to 2007 or, in the worst-case scenario to 2008, changed 
the attractiveness of Romanian economy for foreign capital. However, one 
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important catalyst for the revamping of the Romanian relations with the Arab 
World was represented by the 2005 hostage crisis, when former interpersonal 
networks were resuscitated and when a large part of the plethora of Romanian-
educated Arab elites (a result of the Communist educational policy towards the 
Arab countries), Arab expats and Arab leaders responded positively to Romanian 
requests. For Bucharest, it was clear that by revamping Ceausescu’s legacy 
Romania could derives many benefits from its relations with the Arab World. 
In this context, realizing the relatively high chances for the latent Romanian-Arab 
networks to be revived, Traian Basescu and governmental officials included in 
their agenda a myriad of high level visits from and to Arab countries and began to 
manifest interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by maintaining and enhancing 
dialogue and relations with both Israel and Arab states and by voicing out loud that 
the solution for ending the violence resided resides in the political cohabitation of 
two distinct states (Cioculescu, 2009, p. 202).  
One of the foreign policy deliverables generated by the Americanization of the 
Romanian foreign policy was represented by Romania’s 2005 decision to 
voluntarily comply with a Paris Club debt reduction Recommendation – and 
therefore reduced its Iraq debt (which totalled US$ 2.6 billion) by 80 per cent while 
allowing Baghdad to pay the rest of the debt in subsequent instalments till 2028, 
with 5 years grace.  
After 2007, Romanian political relations with the Arab world and Iran began to be 
circumscribed to EU general strategy towards these states – as according to the 
provisions of the Accession Treaty – Romania had to replace its legal patchwork 
consisting in bilateral political and trade treaties to the EU agreements signed with 
the countries that were part of the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States (GCC) – and namely the State of the United Arab Emirates, the State of 
Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar 
and the State of Kuwait – while amending its bilateral economic cooperation and 
investment protection treaties according to the provisions of the acquis 
communautaire. 
In this context, although the new government manifested a strong political 
openness towards the strengthening of the political and economic cooperation, the 
materialization of Bucharest’s endeavours to ‘renew’ its relations with the Arab 
states were relatively modest.   
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For instance, the dynamics of the Romanian-Kuwait trade exchange reveals a 
relatively a sinusoidal tendency, rising from US$ 7 million (all Romanian exports) 
in 2001 to US$ 26.7 million in 2005 (out of which US$ 0.5 million in Kuwaiti 
exports) to US$ 61.2 million in 2007 and US$ 55.6 million in 2008, yet with a 
dramatic decrease in 2009 and 2010 – to US$ 18.4 million and US$ 23.5 million 
respectively, arguably tributary to the effects of the financial crisis and global 
recession (Ministry of Economy of Romania – Department of Foreign Trade, 
Practical Business Guide for Kuwait, Bucharest, 2013, p. 10) 
In the case of Lebanon – the acclaimed Romania’s ideal gateway to Middle East 
and North Africa Region and a key player in tapping the potential of the Iraqi 
market – the evolution of the bilateral trade reveal that Beirut remained a relatively 
important market for Romanian products, although the figures were significantly 
inferior to those recorded before 1989. Practically the trade volume in 2007 was 
situated at US$ 133.5 million (out of which US$ 128.8 million Romanian exports 
to Lebanon), went more than double in 2008 to a level of US$ 280.1 million (with 
Lebanese exports to Romania reaching a historical high of US$ 11.7 million), 
decreased to US$ 190 million in 2009 and rose again to US$ 235.2 million in 2010, 
with Lebanese exports being situated at US$ 1.9 million and US$ 2.7 million 
respectively (Ministry of Economy and Trade of Lebanon – Economic Research 
Unit, Lebanese exports to Romania, 2012, p. 1).  
An interesting aspect of the Romanian exports in Lebanon is that petroleum oils 
and oils obtained from bituminous minerals represented 52% respectively 57% of 
the export value from 2009 and 2010, while sawn wood came into second place 
with 20% and respectively 16%. The main imports from Lebanon consisted in guts, 
bladders and stomachs of animals and aluminium and copper waste and scrap.  
The most important dimension of the Lebanese Romanian relations derives not so 
much from the dynamics of bilateral trade but from the investment dimension of 
the bilateral cooperation. Historically speaking, Lebanese business circles were 
among the first Arab investors to place capital into the Romanian economy, with 
more than 10.000 companies established immediately after the fall of communism, 
yet due to the economy’s volatility and restrictive and bureaucratic regulations, 
their numbers diminished by two thirds reaching 3000-3500 business ventures, 
mainly small and medium enterprises. However, as of early 2000s and after, 
especially due to the escalating problems in West Africa – a predilectarea for 
Lebanese capital – and in the light of Romania’s 2007 accession to the EU, 
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Romanian economy become again increasingly interesting for Lebanese investors, 
managing to attract – according to a public statement by Romanian president 
Basescu – more than US$ 2 billion by 2012, an amount that placed Beirut first 
among Arab investors. (Romanian President Traian Basescu and Lebanese 
President Michel Sleiman, Joint Press Conference, February 28, 2012, Cotroceni 
Palace, Bucharest).  
The trade exchange pattern between Syria and Romania reveal that Damascus 
remained a constant partner for Bucharest, and that Romania’s EU integration was 
superimposed over a positive tendency of Romanian exports in Syria. For instance 
if in 2001 the total volume of bilateral trade was US$ 129.09 million (with Syrian 
exports to Romania reaching only US$ 4.72 million), the figure recorded constant 
fluctuations in the period 2002-2005: from US$ 104.05 million in 2002 (with 
Lebanese exports increasing to US$ 35.5 million), to US$ 171.26 million in 2003 
(with a record of Lebanese exports of US$ 74.95 million) and to US$ 101.64 in 
2005 and US$ 102.08 in 2006. After integration, the trade volume entered once 
again on a positive path growing to US$ 138.8 in 2007 and US$ 183.64 in 2008 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Romanian Embassy in the Arab Republic 
of Syria, Bilateral economic relations, 2009). 
Overall, Syrian market remained relatively open to Romanian exports throughout 
years 2000, with Romanian companies selling electric equipment, automobiles, 
buses, trains, wagons, construction materials and livestock, while Romanian 
market was targeted by relatively limited imports mainly consisting in cotton, 
textile products, fruits and vegetables, olive oil. In terms of bilateral economic 
cooperation, however, Romanian companies played an important role in the Syrian 
economy as they had a major contribution in the development of the Banias 
Refinery and of Sheikh Said Cement factory, in expansion works for Jibissa gas 
transport and treatment complex and last, but not least, in the land melioration for 
27000 ha of agricultural land in the Euphrates basin. Of note, Romanian-Syrian 
relations benefited – to some extent – from the presence of an active Syrian 
community in Romania, of roughly 10.000 members and by the existence of a 4000 
people Romanian community in Damascus.  
Romania and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan enjoyed a traditional good 
relation, both in the political and economic field, with Bucharest being Amman’s 
main Central and South Eastern European trade partner and Jordan one of the most 
important commercial partner of Bucharest in the Middle East region. As of 2007, 
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the bilateral relations were circumscribed to the provisions of the Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Jordan, which formed the legal basis 
of the EU-Jordan relationship and which entered into force in May 2002. 
The trade balance – with an exceeding deficit against Jordan reveal a strong and 
constant positive tendency for Romanian exports and a relatively low penetration 
of Jordan products on the Romanian market (Jordan imports in Romania reached a 
historical high in 2007 when they were situated at US$ 7 million, with values 
ranging between US$ 2.38 in 2005 and US$ 4.9 in 2010). Overall, the bilateral 
trade between Bucharest and Amman was US$ 34.68 million in 2005, roughly US$ 
50 million both in 2007 and 2008, US$ 66.4 million in 2009 and US$ 82.63 million 
in 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Romanian Embassy in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Bilateral economic relations, 2011). The structure 
of the Romanian exports reveal a significant reliance on energy equipment, steel-
processing, chemical products, spare parts, household equipment and sawn wood. 
Apart from trade, the two countries have witnessed a long term and mutual 
beneficial economic cooperation, with Romanian companies participating in 
various development projects in Jordan, such as energy sector (power generation 
facilities, medium and high voltage transmission lines, substations etc., oil sector 
(modernization and extension works at Zarqa refinery), extension of the storage 
capacity of Aqaba Oil Terminal. Jordan investments in Romania, either direct 
either in association with other Arab or European investors targeted touristic and 
commercial sectors, chemical and pharmaceutical industries and real estate. 
Moreover, Romania and Jordan signed a military agreement in 2004 and agreed to 
intensify the cooperation between Amman’s and Bucharest intelligence Structures 
(Cioculescu, 2009:2004).  
An important market in the MENA Region, Egypt is also one of the few countries 
in the area whose exports to Romanian recorded a significant value. The trade 
volume between Bucharest and Cairo recorded a level of US$ 251.9 million in 
2004, US$ 369.25 million in 2006 and US$ 358.83 million in 2007 (on the fond of 
a significant increase of the Egyptian exports to Romania of US$ 150.79 million 
and US$ 120 million respectively). In 2008 the bilateral exchange fall to US$ 
262.62 million (mainly due to a significant decrease of Egyptian exports) and 
entered on a sinusoidal trajectory in 2009 and 2010 when it reached US$ 302.87 
and US$ 277.54 respectively (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Romanian 
Embassy in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Bilateral economic relations, 2012). 
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The structure of Romanian exports to Egypt mainly consists of tractors, spare parts 
for automobiles, equipment, machinery and spare parts for the cement and oil 
industries, locomotives, components for coaches, rolling stock, timber and timber 
products, scrap metal, bearings, electric motors and switchgear low voltage, power 
windows and glassware, paper and paperboard, plastics, chemicals, mineral oils, 
rubber, synthetic fibres and yarns. On another hand, Egyptian exports to Romania 
are represented by oil (till 1997 accounting for debt claims) cotton, animal hides 
and leather, flax, rice, medicines, detergents and cosmetics, vegetables and fruits, 
ceramic, sanitary ware, consumer goods. However, as in the case of Romanian-
Jordanian relations, an important dimension of the Romanian-Egyptian cooperation 
is that Bucharest and Cairo share not only economic and political, economic and 
cultural relations, but also a military agreement signed in 2001 and an intensive 
cooperation of the two states’ intelligence structures (Cioculescu, 2009, p. 204). 
The evolution pattern of the Romanian-Saudi trade exchange reveal steady 
tendency of growth, with Saudi market absorbing significantly higher quantities of 
Romanian merchandise, and with the exception of the year 1992 – when Romania 
imported significant quantities of crude oil from Saudi Arabia – the trade balance 
surplus in favour of Romania was permanent. 
Since 2006, the trade volume expanded exponentially, mainly due to the increased 
level of Romanian exports into the Arabian Kingdom, although way beyond the 
bilateral potential of such relation. Practically, while at the beginning of the year 
2000 the volume of the bilateral trade was situated at US$ 48.7 million, by 2004 it 
reached US$ 110 million. From 2006 till 2008 the figure rose from US$ 165.9 
million to US$ 190.239 million and US$ 212.09 million respectively with Saudi 
exports varying between US$ 9.2 million in 2006 to US$ 31.38 million in 2008 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Romanian Embassy in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Bilateral economic relations, 2009).  
The Romanian - Saudi trade is that it is conducted directly with the Saudi 
companies (especially after the establishment of a bilateral Council of 
Businessmen, following a 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania and Bucharest and the Council of 
Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry), but also indirectly through already 
established companies in Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria or UAE. The structure of 
Romanian exports to Saudi Arabia relies on wood and wood products, metal 
products, marble, paper, cardboard, light bulbs, electric motors, cables, fertilizers, 
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textiles, clothing, food, live animals, tires, electric meter, equipment and petroleum 
accessories, industrial boilers, while imports mainly consists of mineral oils, 
sulphur, chemicals, furniture, carpets and dates. In terms of investment, according 
to Romanian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia the level of Saudi investment in 
Romania was situated – in 2007 – at US$ 2.2 billion (International Business 
Publications – US-Saudi Arabia Diplomatic and Political Cooperation Handbook, 
2009, p. 196), out of which US$ 174 million represented the acquisition of a 63% 
stake in Romania’s manufacturer of train engines, generators and electrical 
transformers, Electroputere Craiova, by the Saudi Al-Arab Contracting Company 
(ACC) in June 2007. 
Romanian-Iraqi patterns of trade – are entangled with the constrains imposed by 
supranational institutions, yet tributary to the bilateral relation before 1989 when 
Iraq held the first place in Romania’s exports of special products, vehicles, clothing 
and military supplies, textiles, knitwear and footwear, industrial equipment and 
electronics, sodium products, sanitary ware and household items, etc., with Bagdad 
delivering to Romanian market commodities like crude oil, sulphur, aluminium 
fluoride, car batteries or medicines. The embargo instituted by UN Security 
Council, following the first Gulf crisis – led to a complete stop of mutual deliveries 
of goods and of the works under execution in Iraq by Romanian enterprises and 
thus to a zero level in bilateral trade between 1991 and 1995. Between 1997 and 
2003 – in accordance with the provisions of ‘Oil for food’ UN program, Romanian 
companies resumed relations with Iraqi partners, yet the trade level – Romania 
concluded export contracts of US$ 105 million, of which approximately US$ 65 
million, under the approval of Committee 661 of the UN Security Council. 
After 2004, bilateral trade was relatively modest and fluctuant, growing from US$ 
22 million in 2004 to US$ 68.59 million in 2006, then falling to US$ 26.86 million 
in 2007 and exponentially grow in 2008 and 2009 to US$ 93.6 million and US$ 
116.23 million respectively and fall again in 2010 to US$ 66.31 million. With Iraqi 
exports to Romania mainly situated under US$ 1 million, Iraq usually ranked on an 
important position among Romanian trade partners on whom Bucharest records a 
trade balance surplus. The structure of Romanian export in Iraq mainly consisted in 
mineral products (app. 50% of the total trade), machinery and electrical equipment 
(app. 47%) with wood, charcoal, livestock and animal products completing the list 
(Ministry of Economy of Romania – Department of Foreign Trade, Information by 
country: Iraq, 2011, p. 3). 
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United Arab Emirates, Romania’s main commercial partner among the member 
states of the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States (GCC), and 
third commercial partner from Africa and Middle East, is also a re-export hub for 
Romanian products (mostly metal products and bearings) to other regional markets 
in which Romanian presence is insignificant (Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain). The 
level of the bilateral trade-exchange between the two states reached US$ 290 
million in 2009, US$ 340 million in 2010 and US$ 530 million in 2011, with 
Romanian exports dominating the trade balance with values situated at US$ 241 
million in 2009, US$ 320 million 2010 and US$ 461 million in 2011. Emirati 
exports, although substantial in comparison with other countries from the region, 
topped only US$ 70 million in 2011 from US$ 38 million (Bode, Romanian 
Minister of Economy, Trade and Business Environment, cited in Bursa Newspaper, 
April 26, 2012). 
The structure of Romanian exports to EAU mainly consist in petrochemicals and 
metallurgy, electric motors and transformers, industrial valves, bearings, timber, 
helicopters and spare parts, paper, chemicals, while Emirati exports to Romania, 
more diversified and without a dominant product holding a significant share, 
includes electronics and home appliances, consumer goods, cosmetics, essential 
oil, laboratory equipment, textiles, car accessories and seafood. 
Romanian relations with Qatar, Yemen, Oman and Bahrain – severely limited, 
either due to the absence of a diplomatic representation, either due to low 
possibilities for Romanian companies to penetrate the already established local 
markets – are materialized through relatively insignificant levels of the bilateral 
trade: approximately US$ 10 million (2006) and respectively US$ 18 million 
(2007) in the case of Qatar (with Qatari exports being situated at less than US$ 0.5 
million), with Oman at US$ 13 million (2008). 
After 1996, tributary to Romania’s foreign policy orientation that started to 
manifest an increased interest towards Egypt and an extreme sensitiveness to 
American foreign policy interests and perceptions, Romanian – Iranian relations 
began to degrade in terms of quality and engagement, though they were not 
formally severed. In particular, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) – an 1996 act 
of the US Congress that imposed economic sanctions on firms doing business with 
Teheran and Tripoli, and thus allowed Washington to involve into the bilateral 
relations of Iran and third countries – did triggered important effects to Romanian-
Iranian relation as Bucharest, struggling to ‘come closer to EU and NATO’ was 
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undertaking any possible actions that could have ‘won it US’ good will’ 
(Cioculescu, 2009, p. 203).  
Moreover, Romania aligned itself with West in its conflict with Iran regarding 
Teheran’s nuclear program which erupted in 2003 – after the discovery in 2003 of 
nuclear activities undisclosed by Iranian authorities to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) – and reached a critical level – after several failed rounds 
of negotiations (in 2005, 2006 and 2008) during which Iran rejected various far-
reaching proposals for developing a modern civil nuclear power programme under 
the control of IAEA, and also important cooperation incentives with the EU – and 
finally leading to a series of subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions imposing 
a plethora of sanctions to Teheran. Furthermore, Romania adhered to 2009 France-
Germany-United Kingdom’s proposed set of even stricter sanctions to Iran which 
were adopted in July 2010, and aimed Iran’s crucial areas of international trade: 
financial services, energy and transport. 
However, till 2010, the loopholes and gaps in the laws imposing the sanctions, 
allowed various companies to sell equipment’s for Iran oil and gas industry or 
petrochemical plants, the very backbone of the Iranian economy. In this context, 
argues Kozhanov, although during the period 2006-2010 Washington occasionally 
managed to persuade Western oil companies to stop the selling of such equipment 
to Teheran, ‘it failed to do the same with companies from Eastern Europe (the most 
active were companies from Romania, Hungary and Belarus) and the Far East’. 
Moreover, until 2010, sanctions also failed to seriously influence oil and petrol 
trade with Iran (2011, p. 1).  
In this context, Romanian-Iranian trade exchange reached in 2008 US$ 245.71 
million, with the Romanian exports to Iran skyrocketing from US$ 59.04 million in 
2004 to US$ 167,86 million in 2008 (Ministry of Economy of Romania – 
Department of Foreign Trade, Iran Business Handbook, Bucharest 2014: 1). In 
2009, the bilateral trade manifested a negative tendency with a total level of US$ 
141.4 million with Romanian exports to Iran reaching US$ 118.5 million, yet the 
trend eventually reversed in 2010 when the volume topped US$ 195.96 million, out 
of which Romanian exports represented US$ 154 million (Balkananalysis 
Research Service – Romanian-Iran Bilateral Trade Statistics, Contacts and 
Companies, 2011, p. 1). According to Romanian governmental data, the structure 
of Romanian exports to Iran reveals a relative dominance of vehicle parts and 
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accessories, metal products and machinery, with Iranian exports to Romania 
mainly consisting in crude oil, hydrocarbons, paraformaldehyde and fruits.  
To a certain extent the data might be somehow biased, as some exports are 
believed to take place – due to transport and payment related reasons, through 
intermediary countries like Turkey. Similarly, in terms of investments, the data 
from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – stating that in 2008 more than 
2500 join ventures involving Iranian capital activated in Romanian economy thus 
placing Iran on the 38th positions among the states making foreign investments in 
the indigenous economy – might equally fail to reflect the real dimension of the 
Iranian investment, as an important part of the capital and business fluxes take part 
through third-country or indirectly registered companies, mostly Russian based 
joint-ventures. 
 
Conclusions 
The fall (and execution) of Ceaușescu during December 1989 riots and 
violencemeantthat thecardinal force that cultivated the pro-Palestinian and pro-
Arab credentials and acted as the main catalyst for political and socio-economic 
cooperation between Romania, Iran and the (non-US alligned) Arab world, ceased 
to exist. 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the events, the new leadership – trying to exhibit 
democratic and European pedigree –oriented Romania’s trade fluxes towards 
convertible (mostly Western) markets and gradually renounced at the development 
of the indigenous oil, chemical and export-oriented industries that supplied most of 
Romanian exports to developing countries. In this context, Bucharest found no 
incentives in pursuing privileged relations with the Arab world, despite of the fact 
that following the Ba’athist Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Romania established 
diplomatic relations with United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain, 
states with an immense economic potential for absorbing Romanian imports. 
In general, by mid 1990s and till late 2000s, Romania’s behavioural dynamics 
towards the Arab World and Iran took place under the form of an alter casting 
process – implemented through institutional, organizational or legal means – 
through which Washington or EU provided Bucharest cues, norms and expectation 
to elicit certain behaviour. However, although politically, Romanian leadership 
aligned the country with US and EU articulated preferences and perspectives, in 
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the economical realm, indigenous companies’ behaviour wasn’t necessarily 
circumscribed to the governmental rhetoric and actions.  
By 2006, faced with the perspective of EU single-market pressures, Romanian 
government embarked itself a quest to resuscitate the latent relations with the Arab 
states from the Middle East and Iran. The materialization of these endeavours 
remained – despite some revamping of the bilateral trade fluxes – at a modest level 
for the next years, in comparison with the level they recorded in throughout the 
1980s. 
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